Supreme Court: The 3-judge bench of RF Nariman, BR Gavai and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ has held that given the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Commercial Courts Act, 2015, for appeals filed under section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule.
However,
“in a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party’s inaction, negligence or laches.”
Resultantly, the Court has overruled last year’s judgment in N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 , wherein it was held that any delay beyond 120 days in the filing of an appeal under Section 37 from an application being either dismissed or allowed under Section 34 cannot be allowed. It was further, clarified that the said period of 120 days, comprises of a grace period of 30 days under Section 5 of the Limitation Act added to the prescribed period of 90 days.
The Court said that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right in the appellant to have delay condoned.
“Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims.”
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, when read with section 43 thereof, makes it clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act will apply to appeals that are filed under section 37. Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act provide for a limitation period of 90 days and 30 days, depending upon whether the appeal is from any other court to a High Court or an intra-High Court appeal. Further, when the Commercial Courts Act is applied to the aforesaid appeals, given the definition of “specified value” and the provisions contained in sections 10 and 13 thereof, it is clear that it is only when the specified value is for a sum less than three lakh rupees that the appellate provision contained in section 37 of the Arbitration Act will be governed, for the purposes of limitation, by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act.
On this, the Court explained that,
“… the main object of the Arbitration Act requiring speedy resolution of disputes would be the most important principle to be applied when applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act are filed to condone delay beyond 90 days and/or 30 days depending upon whether Article 116(a) or 116(b) or 117 applies. As a matter of fact, given the timelines contained in sections 8, 9(2), 11(4), 11(13), 13(2)-(5), 29A, 29B, 33(3)-(5) and 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, and the observations made in some of this Court’s judgments, the object of speedy resolution of disputes would govern appeals covered by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act.”
Hence, from the scheme of the Arbitration Act, condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be seen in the context of the object of speedy resolution of disputes.
Why was NV International overruled?
Firstly, N.V. International does not notice the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act at all and can be said to be per incuriam on this count.
Secondly, the period of 90 days plus 30 days and not thereafter mentioned in section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act cannot now apply, the limitation period for filing of appeals under the Commercial Courts Act being 60 days and not 90 days.
Thirdly, the argument that absent a provision curtailing the condonation of delay beyond the period provided in section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act would also make it clear that any such bodily lifting of the last part of section 34(3) into section 37 of the Arbitration Act would also be unwarranted.
Stating that the difference between interpretation and legislation is sometimes a fine one, as it has repeatedly been held that judges do not merely interpret the law but also create law, the Court referred to the judgment in Eera v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 15 SCC 133, wherein it was held,
“The golden rule in determining whether the judiciary has crossed the Lakshman Rekha in the guise of interpreting a statute is really whether a Judge has only ironed out the creases that he found in a statute in the light of its object, or whether he has altered the material of which the Act is woven. In short, the difference is the well-known philosophical difference between “is” and “ought”. Does the Judge put himself in the place of the legislator and ask himself whether the legislator intended a certain result, or does he state that this must have been the intent of the legislator and infuse what he thinks should have been done had he been the legislator. If the latter, it is clear that the Judge then would add something more than what there is in the statute by way of a supposed intention of the legislator and would go beyond creative interpretation of legislation to legislating itself. It is at this point that the Judge crosses the Lakshman Rekha and becomes a legislator, stating what the law ought to be instead of what the law is.”
Hence, given the ‘lakshman rekha’ laid down in the aforementioned judgment, the Court found it little difficult to appreciate how a cap can be judicially engrafted onto a statutory provision which then bars condonation of delay by even one day beyond the cap so engrafted.
[Government of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 233, decided on 19.03.2021]
*Judgment by: Justice RF Nariman
