Bombay High Court: Manish Pitale, J., while setting aside an impugned order explained the slight difference between principles laid down under Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 from the principle of double jeopardy under Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India.
Petitioner invoked the principles of nemo debet bis vexari (no man shall be put twice in peril for the same offence) and autrefois acquit (the person has been acquitted on a same charge on which he is being prosecuted), embodied in Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, in order to demonstrate that the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate in the present case erred in passing the impugned order.
It was stated that a complaint was submitted before the police by the Food Safety Officer alleging that banned substances i.e. Gutkha and other such material was found stored in Om Shanti Pan Center at Malkapur, run by the petitioner.
Petitioner was acquitted for offences under Sections 188 and 272 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Section 59 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006.
Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate found that even though there was an order of acquittal in favour of the petitioner for offence under Section 59 of the FSS Act, since the acquittal order was passed by a Court, which was not competent to try offence under the FSS Act, the order of acquittal could be of no avail. It was held that since the order of acquittal was passed by the Court, which could not be said to be a Court of competent jurisdiction, Section 300 of the CrPC could not be invoked.
Challenging the above decision of the Court, present petition was filed.
Analysis, Law and Decision
High Court expressed that Section 300 of the CrPC embodies the following two principles:
- nemo debet bis vexari (no man shall be put twice in peril for the same offence) and
- autrefois acquit (the person has been acquitted on a same charge on which he is being prosecuted).
Bench stated that the above two principles are slightly different from the principle of double jeopardy embodied in Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India.
Court found the finding of Chief Judicial Magistrate to be in the teeth of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Sayyed Hassan Subhan, (2019) 18 SCC 145, wherein it had been categorically held that the Food Safety Officer can also lodge complaints about offences punishable under the IPC, in addition to offences under FSS Act.
After referring to the said provision, the Supreme Court held that the Food Safety Officer could certainly initiate prosecution under the provisions of the IPC as well as the FSS Act, so long as the ingredients of the offences stood satisfied.
“…provisions of the FSS Act make it clear that there is no bar for prosecution under the IPC, merely because the provisions in the FSS Act prescribe penalty.”
In view of the above, it was held that the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate in the impugned order committed an error in proceeding on the basis that when FIR was registered against the petitioner for offences under the IPC and FSS Act, the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class could not have conducted the trial against the petitioner, insofar as the offence under the FSS Act was concerned.
The subsequent complaint lodged by the Food Safety Officer dated 20-01-2015, also specifically pertains to the same alleged incident dated 27-01-2014, in respect of which the petitioner already faced trial for alleged offences under the IPC and the very same provision i.e. Section 59 of the FSS Act and stood acquitted by the judgment and order dated 24-08-2015. Thus, the subsequent complaint lodged by the Food Safety Officer dated 20-01-2015, pertaining to the very same incident and for the very same alleged offence under Section 59 of the FSS Act.
Court found that the principles embodied under Section 300 CrPC clearly apply to the facts of the present matter.
Further, applying the said principle, High Court held that it becomes evident that if the impugned order was upheld and the petitioner was made to face the criminal proceedings subsequently initiated by the Food Safety Officer, it would amount to putting him twice in peril for the same offence, which cannot be permitted and hence the impugned order was set aside.
In view of the above, petition was allowed.[Sachin v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 1576, decided on 4-08-2021]
Advocates before the Court:
Mr Akshay Naik, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr Sagar Ashirgade, APP for respondents.
