Supreme Court: While dealing with a case involving two controversial terms; “operational debt” and “operational creditor” of IBC, the 3-judge Bench of Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud* Surya Kant and Vikram Nath, JJ., explained that the appellant would be an operational creditor under the IBC, since an ‘operational debt’ will include a debt arising from a contract in relation to the supply of goods or services from the corporate debtor. The Bench expressed,
“…no doubt that a debt which arises out of advance payment made to a corporate debtor for supply of goods or services would be considered as an operational debt.”
Factual Conspectus
The genesis of the case related to following undisputed facts:
- the Consolidated Construction Consortium Ltd.-appellant and the Proprietary Concern; i.e. Hitro Energy Solutions entered into a contract for supply of light fittings, since the appellant had been engaged for a project by Chennai Metro Rail Corpn. (CMRL);
- CMRL, on the appellant’s behalf, paid a sum of Rs 50 lakhs to the Proprietary Concern as an advance on its order with the appellant;
- CMRL cancelled its project with the appellant;
- The Proprietary Concern encashed the cheque for Rs 50 lakhs anyways; and
- The appellant paid the sum of Rs 50 lakhs to CMRL.
Impugned Order
It was when the proprietary concerned refused to pay the aforesaid sum despite several notices and demands, the appellant approached NCLT under Section 9 of the IBC for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against the respondent, Hitro Energy Solutions (P) Ltd. The NCLT allowed the application holding that the respondent’s Memorandum of Association (MoA) proved that it took over the proprietary concern; and that the Proprietary Concern did owe the appellant an outstanding operational debt. Further, the NCLT declared a moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC and appointed an Interim Resolution Professional.
In appeal, the NCLAT set aside the NCLT’s decision, dismissed the application filed under Section 9 of the IBC and released the respondent from ongoing CIRP on the following grounds:
- The appellant was a ‘purchaser’, and thus did not come under the definition of ‘operational creditor’ under the IBC since it did not supply any goods or services to the Proprietary Concern/respondent;
- There was nothing on record to suggest that the respondent had taken over the Proprietary Concern; and
- The appellant could not move an application under Sections 7 or 9 of the IBC since all purchase orders were issued on 24 June 2013 and advance cheques were issued subsequently. Hence, there was unjustified delay.
However, by an interim order, the Supreme Court had stayed the operation of NCLAT’s judgment.
Whether the appellant was an operational creditor
The NCLAT, sought to narrowly define operational debt and operational creditors under the IBC to only include those who supply goods or services to a corporate debtor and exclude those who receive goods or services from the corporate debtor. Rejecting the stand taken by NCLAT, the Bench observed the following:
Firstly, Section 5(21) defines ‘operational debt’ as a “claim in respect of the provision of goods or services”. The operative requirement is that the claim must bear some nexus with a provision of goods or services, without specifying who is to be the supplier or receiver.
Secondly, Section 8(1) of the IBC read with Rule 5(1) and Form 3 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules 2016 and Regulation 7(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the CIRP Regulations 2016 make it abundantly clear that an operational creditor can issue a notice in relation to an operational debt either through a demand notice or an invoice. As such, the Bench opined,
“…the presence of an invoice (for having supplied goods or services) is not a sine qua non, since a demand notice can also be issued on the basis of other documents which prove the existence of the debt.”
Finally, in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 8 SCC 416, in comparing allottees in real estate projects to operational creditors, the Supreme Court had noted that the latter do not receive any time value for their money as consideration but only provide it in exchange for goods or services.
Therefore, the Bench opined that the phrase “in respect of” in Section 5(21) has to be interpreted in a broad and purposive manner in order to include all those who provide or receive operational services from the corporate debtor, which ultimately lead to an operational debt. In the instant case, the appellant clearly sought an operational service from the Proprietary Concern when it contracted with them for the supply of light fittings. Further, when the contract was terminated but the Proprietary Concern nonetheless encashed the cheque for advance payment, it gave rise to an operational debt in favor of the appellant, which remained unpaid.
Whether the respondent took over the debt from Proprietary Concern
The MoA of the respondent unequivocally stated that one of its main objects was to take over the Proprietary Concern. However, the respondent had produced a resolution dated 01-09-2014 passed by its Board of Directors, purportedly resolving to not take over the Proprietary Concern. In this regard, the Bench observed,
“Admittedly, there was no reference to the resolution in the counter-statement dated 18 January 2018 and additional counter-statement dated 9 March 2018 filed by the respondent before the NCLT. However, in their appeal filed before the NCLAT, the respondent states that the resolution was, in fact, brought to the notice of the NCLT.”
Additionally, the NCLT made no mention of that resolution or the auditor’s certificate in its judgment. Therefore, the Bench opined that the conduct of the respondent in bringing up the resolution for the first time before the NCLAT would lead to an adverse inference against them for having suppressed the document earlier, if at all it was in existence.
Even otherwise, Section 13 of CA 2013 provides that where the object clause is amended in MoA, it requires the Registrar to register the Special Resolution filed by the company. However, the respondent had provided no proof that the purported resolution was a Special Resolution, it was filed before the Registrar and that the Registrar ultimately did register that. Thus, the purported amendment to the MOA would not have any legal effect. Consequently, the Bench held that the MOA of the respondent still stands and the presumption would continue to be in favour of the appellant.
Whether the application under Section 9 of IBC was barred by limitation
Rejecting the respondent’s submission that limitation commenced from 07-11-2013, when the cheque was issued by CMRL to the Proprietary Concern and that considering three years limitation period under Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963, the period would expire on 07-11-2016, while the application under Section 9 was only filed on 01-11-2017, the Bench observed, in its application under Section 9, the appellant had mentioned 07-11-2013 as the date on which the debt became due.
However, in B.K. Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates, (2019) 11 SCC 633, it was held that limitation does not commence when the debt becomes due but only when a default occurs. As noted, default is defined under Section 3(12) of the IBC as the non-payment of the debt by the corporate debtor when it has become due. Hence, it was only on 27-02-2017 that the final letter was addressed by the appellant to the Proprietary Concern demanding the payment on or before 04-03-2017 and Proprietary Concern replied on 02-03-2017, finally refusing to make re-payment to the appellant. Consequently, the application under Section 9 would not be barred by limitation.
Conclusion
Hence, the appeal was allowed and the impugned judgment and order were set aside. Since the CIRP in respect of the respondent was ongoing due to the Court’s order dated 18-11-2020, no further directions were issued.
[M/s Consolidated Construction Consortium Ltd. v. M/s Hitro Energy Solutions (P) Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 142, decided on 04-02-2022]
*Judgment by: Justice Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud
Appearance by:
For the Appellant: M P Parthiban, Advocate
For the Respondent: K Parameshwar, Advocate
Kamini Sharma, Editorial Assistant has put this report together