Acquisition, Requisition and Nationalisation \u2014 Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1995 \u2014 Ss. 4(2) and 4(5):<\/strong> Adjudication by High Court, exercising writ jurisdiction, on the liability of National Textile Corporation Ltd. (NTC) qua debts of textile mill taken over by it, not permissible. [UCO Bank v. National Textile Corpn. Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 497<\/a>]<\/p>\n Anomalies in law and justice:<\/strong> This article attempts to explain the anomalies in law and justice\u2014that is, the inconsistencies, contradictions or absurdities in law and justice and identify the solutions for rectification wherever possible. Some Anomalies in Law and Justice by Justice R.V. Raveendran [(2020) 4 SCC (J-49)<\/a>]<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong>Constitution of India \u2014 Arts. 72 & 161 and 32 \u2014 Disposal of mercy petition against death sentence:<\/strong> Principles summarised regarding limited scope of judicial review of disposal of mercy petition against death sentence. Issue of ground of non-supply of documents sought for under RTI Act, held, is beyond the scope of present judicial review. [Vinay Sharma v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 391<\/a>]<\/p>\n Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 \u2014 S. 482 \u2014 Quashment re action taken under SARFAESI Act and qua disbursal of sanctioned loan\/valuation\/auction-sale by creditor bank\/auction-purchaser:<\/strong> Sanction of loan, creation of mortgage and the manner in which the sanctioned loan was to be released are all contractual matters between the parties. Further, if any amount was withheld, the complainant in this case was required to take appropriate action at that point in time and avail his remedy but the complainant had proceeded with the transaction, maintained the loan account until the account was classified as NPA. Further, SARFAESI Act is a complete code in itself which provides the procedure to be followed by the secured creditor and also the remedy to the aggrieved parties including the borrower and if there is any discrepancy in the manner of classifying the account of the appellants as NPA or in the manner in which the property was valued or was auctioned, DRT is vested with the power to set aside such auction at the stage after the secured creditor invokes the power under S. 13 of SARFAESI Act. Further, the petitioner after dismissal of the application before the DRT filed the impugned complaint which appeared to be an intimidatory tactic and an afterthought which is an abuse of the process of law. Also, S. 32 of SARFAESI Act provides for the immunity from prosecution since protection is provided thereunder for the action taken in good faith. [K. Virupaksha v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 4 SCC 440<\/a>]<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong>Education Law \u2014 Employment and Service Matters re Educational Institutions \u2014 Appointment\/Recruitment \u2014 Post of Principal in government polytechnic college \u2014 Eligibility criteria:<\/strong> The AICTE [Pay Scales, Service Conditions and Qualifications for the Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Technical Institutions (Diploma)] Regulations, 2010 prescribed \u201cQualification as above for post of HoD and PhD in Engineering or qualification as above for post of HoD\u201d. The word \u201cor\u201d indicates that PhD in Engineering is optional. [Gelus Ram Sahu v. Surendra Kumar Singh, (2020) 4 SCC 484<\/a>]<\/p>\n Foreign Trade, Export, Import and Investment \u2014 Foreign Trade Policy 2004-2009: <\/strong>In this case, appellant purchaser from 100% export-oriented unit claimed benefit of special Agricultural Produce Scheme in respect of exports made by it. Circular dt. 21-1-2009 was issued to clarify that scheme notified on 7-4-2006 specifically excluded 100% export-oriented units from its applicability. The validity of the said circular was challenged with the contention that Circular dt. 21-1-2009 was contrary to scheme notified on 7-4-2006 which had statutory force and hence, could not be modified or amended by executive instructions. The Supreme Court held that the Circular dt. 21-1-2009 did not modify or amend scheme notified on 7-4-2006 but only clarified that 100% export-oriented units which were not entitled to seek exemption could not avail benefit indirectly through purchasers from them. It was further held, in terms of Cl. 3.8.5 of the Scheme, Government had reserved right in public interest to specify from time to time exports which were not eligible for entitlement, and hence, Circular dt. 21-1-2009 was valid. [Nola Ram Dulichand Dal Mills v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 406<\/a>]<\/p>\n Income Tax Act, 1961 \u2014 Ss. 115-O, 115-Q, 115-QA, 2(22), 2(22)(d) and 2(22)(a) \u2014 Buyback of shares \u2014 Taxability of:<\/strong> While considering communication by Revenue qua tax liability of assessee Company on purchase of its own shares, as a show-cause notice, as opposed to a final order, directions issued for grant of opportunity to file reply, oral hearing to assessee and for decision of case on merits by authorities. [Cognizant Technology Solutions (India) (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2020) 4 SCC 430<\/a>]<\/p>\n Local Government, Municipalities and Panchayats \u2014 Town Planning \u2014 Layout\/Master\/Zonal Plan \u2014 Modification\/Change in the approved layout plan:<\/strong> A modification cannot be struck down when the law permits such change which is in terms of the statute and the plans that have the force of law. Further, as long as the layout plans conform to the development control norms, the court would not substitute its own opinion as to what principle or policy would best serve greater public or private interest. [M.P. Housing & Infrastructure Development Board v. Vijay Bodana, (2020) 4 SCC 521<\/a>]<\/p>\n Marine Insurance Act, 1963 \u2014 Ss. 35 and 36 \u2014 Liability of insurer under a marine insurance policy \u2014 Discharge of, when there is a breach of warranty by assured:<\/strong> Non-compliance with the Institute Classification Clause (ICC) of the marine insurance policy, dealing with seaworthiness of the vessel in which the cargo is carried, can be considered as a breach of warranty. Further, held, when a warranty is not complied with i.e. there is a breach of warranty, the insurer is discharged from liability from the date of such breach, by virtue of Section 35(3) of the Marine Insurance Act, 1963 and such discharge of liability does not require any express conduct or representation from the insurer. [Rajankumar & Bros. (Impex) v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 364<\/a>]<\/p>\n Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 \u2014 Ss. 166 and 168 \u2014 Permanent disability \u2014 Just compensation \u2014 Principles summarized:<\/strong> Principles for determination of just compensation contemplated under MV Act are well settled. Apart from injury, claimant has to be compensated for consequential losses. [Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 4 SCC 413<\/a>]<\/p>\n Penal Code, 1860 \u2014 Ss. 302 and 364: <\/strong>In this case of murder of three minor children by accused in disturbed mental state, wife of accused having run away with uncle of victim children, death sentence of accused commuted to life imprisonment for entire life without any remission for 25 yrs. [Manoj Suryavanshi v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 4 SCC 451<\/a>]<\/p>\n Stamp Act, 1899 \u2014 Ss. 35, 36 and Art. 23 Expln. & Art. 48(f) (as amended by Orissa Act 1 of 2003) \u2014 Impounding of powers of attorney dt. 21-2-2011 and 4-10-2008 when required to be treated as conveyance for insufficient stamping:<\/strong> Judicial determination of objection regarding necessity of payment of, and sufficiency of stamp duty paid, necessary. In this case, the findings of the Trial court as well as High Court that since power of attorney was a registered document, it was properly stamped without examining as to whether power of attorney was to be stamped as conveyance on account of delivery of possession at time of execution of power of attorney, not proper. The question whether possession was transferred at the time or after execution of power of attorney is question of fact which is required to be decided by court at time of final decision being adjudicated after evidence is led by parties and not merely on basis of recitals in power of attorney. Further held, though such objection is required to be decided at threshold but in case where evidence is required to determine nature of document, it is reasonable to defer that issue to time of final decision in suit. [Z. Engineers Construction (P) Ltd. v. Bipin Bihari Behera, (2020) 4 SCC 358<\/a>]<\/p>\n